Introduction
In a deregulated electricity market, the "missing money" problem of inadequate generation investment incentive arises when the revenue from energy sales at wholesale spot market prices falls short of the required revenues by a merchant plant owner (Joskow, 2013) . We explore this problem through an econometric analysis of the payoffs of a tolling agreement for natural-gas-fired generation. 1 The agreement is a capacity contract that may be used by a local load distribution company (LDC) to manage its procurement cost risks (Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Deng and Oren, 2006; Deng and Xia, 2006; Woo et al., 2006; Benth and Eriksson, 2013) .
After making an upfront lease payment to an owner of natural-gas-fired generation, the LDC obtains the right, but not the obligation, to dispatch the contracted capacity, rather than to buy from the spot market (Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; Deng and Xia, 2006) . The LDC's least-cost dispatch decision's payoff is the positive difference between the market price and the contracted capacity's per MWH variable cost. The expected sum of such payoffs over the agreement's duration mirrors what the LDC is willing to pay for the contracted capacity, thus portraying the market-based investment incentive for natural-gas-fired generation.
To see how the investment incentive for natural-gas-fired generation may move with the fundamental drivers (e.g., natural-gas price, system loads and wind generation), this paper estimates the drivers' effects on the ex post payoffs of three hypothetical tolling agreements. These agreements correspond to the heat rates of 7 MMBTU/MWH for a new combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT), 9 MMBTU/MWH for a new combustion 1 We use the tolling agreement solely as a numerical vehicle for analyzing the natural-gas-fired generation's payoffs, thus not suggesting that a new plant's construction necessarily depends on a signed agreement.
further details on the state's electricity features, see Potomac Economics (2014) and ERCOT (2012b ERCOT ( , 2014b .
Our exploration is also motivated by concerns of insufficient generation investment to maintain system reliability in an energy-only market like ERCOT (Brattle, 2012; ERCOT, 2014a) . Such concerns reflect: (a) no major new generation is under construction (ERCOT, 2014a); 6 (b) several planned projects are postponed (Brattle, 2012; ERCOT, 2012a) ; and (c) there has been substantial retirement of generation units since 2009 (Brattle, 2012; ERCOT, 2014a) ; and (d) the possible impact of federal environmental regulations (e.g., the Clean Power Plan) upon the state's large coal plants.
We fully recognize that despite the absence of a capacity market, the lights are staying on and new power plants are getting built in Texas. Nonetheless, ERCOT may eventually need to establish a capacity market, as already done in other deregulated markets in the U.S. (e.g., New York, PJM and New England) (Spees et al. 2013) . This is because the state's projected wind generation development may have a potentially large adverse impact on generation investment incentive.
Thanks to government policies designed to promote renewable energy development (Alagappan et al., 2011) , rising wind generation suppresses the spot market price through the merit-order effect of displacing thermal generation units with relatively high marginal fuel costs (EWEA, 2010). As its projected price reduction adversely affects a generator's market-based revenue, wind generation development exacerbates the missing money problem (Sensfuss et al., 2008; Bushnell, 2010; Steggals et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2012; Woo et al., 2012; Hach and Spinler, 2014) . Extant research also finds that natural-gas-fired generation's payoffs and therefore profitability moves with such fundamental drivers as the natural-gas price, system loads and nuclear generation (e.g., Traber and Kemfert, 2012; Woo et al., 2015) .
One may model the stochastic process of market price data to valuate a tolling agreement (e.g., Deng and Xia, 2003; Ryabchenko and Uryasev, 2011; Inderfurth et al., 2013; Thompson, 2013) . Here we implement a regression approach based on Woo et al. (2015) to analyze a tolling agreement's ex post payoffs, so as to transparently find the fundamental drivers' likely impact on its valuation and therefore the incentive to invest in natural-gas-fired generation.
Using a large sample of over 134,000 15-minute observations in the 46-month period of 01/01/2011 -10/31/2014, we find an increase in ERCOT's non-West regional loads tends to increase the ex post payoffs.
Although a natural-gas price increase raises the agreement's fuel cost, it likely enhances the ex post payoffs.
Similarly, declining nuclear generation tends to increase the ex post payoffs. However, these payoff increases may vanish because of rising wind generation. Taken together, these findings lend support to a suggestion of ERCOT's eventual transition from an energy-only market to an energy-and-capacity market, so as to mitigate the missing money problem magnified by the state's large-scale wind generation development.
Our main contributions are as follows. First, our analytical framework is comprehensive, encompassing the payoff effects of several fundamental drivers. It extends the extant studies which mainly consider a single resource: wind generation (Traber and Kemfert, 2011; Steggals, et al., 2011; Woo et al., 2012) .
Second, we document the diminishing investment incentives due to wind generation development in 7
Texas. The negative payoff effects of wind generation corroborate the empirical evidence found for Great Britain (Steggals, et al., 2011) , California (Woo et al., 2015) and Germany (Traber and Kemfert, 2011) .
Finally, we enrich the extant studies by illustrating an approach that can be used to analyze the ex post payoffs in other deregulated power markets. For example, the approach can be adapted to analyze how the investment incentives for natural-gas-fired generation may be affected by the phase-out of nuclear plants in
Germany and elsewhere in the aftermath of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our methodology. Section 3 describes our data sample. Section 4 reports our results. Section 5 concludes.
Methodology

Payoff formula
To define the ex post payoff of a hypothetical 1-MW tolling agreement in Texas, consider the per MWH fuel cost of natural-gas-fired generation on day d (= 01/01/2011 -10/31/2014 for our chosen sample period) at the daily natural-gas price G d :
where H = heat rate (MMBTU/MWH) specified in the agreement. Ignoring the likely small per MWH non-fuel cost, 7 the agreement's per MWH payoff can be expressed as:
where P td = 15-minute spot market price ($/MWH) of interval t = 1, …, 96 on day d. 7 As part of our investigation, we verify that including the typically small non-fuel variable cost of less than $5/MWH has no material effects on our findings.
An OLS regression analysis of the V td data likely yields biased estimates because of the series' many zero values (Maddala, 1983) , as shown in To circumvent the estimation challenge, we use an alternative approach proposed by Woo et al. (2015) .
Define the per MWH procurement cost of a LDC that practices least-cost dispatch of the contracted natural-gas-fired MW:
The resulting Y td data series have few zero values (which occur only when P td = 0), thus amenable to a standard regression analysis, sans concerns of sample truncation bias detailed in Maddala (1983) .
We can compute the per MWH payoff as:
We verify the numerical validity of equation (2). When
For a map of the four major regions and their resource mixes, see Woo et al. (2011b, p.3930) . When ERCOT switched to a nodal market, Austin Energy, CPS Energy of San Antonio, the Lower Colorado River Authority, and Sam Rayburn Coop all got their own zones. But these zones tend to be smaller "carve-outs" and there is no retail competition within these newly-created zones.
The West region has noticeable high mean payoff values over the 46-month period: $15.391/MWH for a CCGT, $13.563/MWH for a CT, and $12.302/MWH for an old CT. This is chiefly because the spot price patterns of the West region have changed very dramatically over the years from 2009 to 2011. Around 2009, the West zonal prices were relatively low and even bore negative values (Woo et al., 2012) since there was more wind output than could be possibly moved out of the zone. Starting from 2010, because of the boom in oil and natural-gas production, population in the West region swelled and the spot price for electricity soared.
Using equation (2), we can find the marginal payoff effect of a fundamental driver X ktd :
To apply equation (3), we first estimate a market price regression to explain the variations in P td and a per MWH procurement cost regression to explain the variations in Y td . We then use the two regressions' coefficient estimates to infer the payoff effect of a given driver, as demonstrated by the next subsection below.
Regression model
For region j in ERCOT (j = 1 for Houston, 2 for North, 3 for South, and 4 for West), equation (4) below is the market price regression. Equation (5) is the per MWH procurement cost regression that corresponds to each of the three heat rates of 7, 9 and 11 MMBTU/MWH.
In equation (4),  jtd is a time-varying intercept that accounts for the residual price variations not captured by other RHS variables. We assume  jtd to be a linear function of the binary indicators for a price observation's hour-of-day, day-of-week, and month of year. The time-dependent intercept  jtd in equation (5) is specified analogously.
Following Woo et al. (2011a) and Zarnikau et al. (2014) , the right-hand-side (RHS) variables are the following fundamental drivers:
We do not know a priori the payoff effect of a natural-gas price increase that raises both the market price and the per MWH procurement cost.
 (X 1td , …, X 4td ) = 15-minute total loads (MWH) of ERCOT's four regions. We expect rising loads to increase payoffs because of their demand effects on market prices.
 X 5td = 15-minute total nuclear generation (MWH) from the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant and South Texas Project. We expect an increase in nuclear generation to reduce payoffs because of its supply effect on market prices.
 X 6td = 15-minute total wind generation (MWH). A majority of wind farms in Texas reside in the sparsely populated West region (Woo et al., 2011b) . We expect an increase in wind generation to reduce payoffs because of its merit-order effect on market prices.
The random errors ε jtd and μ jtd are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated and follow an AR(n) process. We use the iterated seemingly unrelated regression (ITSUR) method of PROC MODEL in SAS (2004) to efficiently estimate each region-specific system. Since there are three per MWH procurement costs, each system has four equations to be estimated.
We use the ITSUR results to estimate the k th driver's marginal payoff effect h k and its variance Var(h k ):
Three reasons support our model specification. First, a linear specification is a first-order approximation of an unknown nonlinear specification. Although a double-log form can account for nonlinearity and provide elasticity estimates, the presence of negative market prices denies us that opportunity.
Second, we can readily apply equations (6) and (7) to perform a t-test of the null hypothesis of zero payoff effect. Finally, Section 4 below shows that our proposed specification yields plausible estimates that are meaningful and statistically significant ( = 0.1).
Data
Our data construction makes the following assumptions:
 Sample period. It is 01/01/2011 to /10/31/2014. Its beginning date is one month after ERCOT first adopted its current nodal market structure on 12/01/2010. We decide not to use the December 2010 data because of ERCOT's data reporting issues in the first month of nodal pricing. Its ending date reflects the data available at the time of our writing.
 Heat rate (MMBTU/MWH). It is 7 MMBTU/MWH for a new CCGT, 9 MMBTU/MWH for a new CT, and 11 MMBTU/MWH for an old CT.
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 Natural-gas price ($/MMBTU). It is the daily Henry Hub natural-gas price because the local Houston Ship Channel Natural Gas Price may be endogenous, and the two natural gas price series are highly correlated (r > 0.95).
 Electricity price. While the day-ahead market (DAM) prices and real-time market (RTM) prices are available from ERCOT, we decide to use the RTM prices to circumvent the difficulty of obtaining day-ahead forecasts for the RHS variables to match the DAM prices (Woo et al., 2013) . More importantly, the RTM prices are more volatile than the DAM prices. Based on the payoff formula of a call option, the RTM prices yield higher payoffs than the DAM prices (Woo et al., 2015) .
 Regional loads. They are the four major regions' 15-minute total loads (MWH) provided by ERCOT.
 Nuclear generation. It is the total 15-minute nuclear generation (MWH) provided by ERCOT.
 Wind generation. It is the total 15-minute wind generation (MWH) provided by ERCOT.
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Panel A of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the RTM prices and the per MWH procurement costs. We apply the Phillips-Perron unit root test (Philips and Perron, 1988) to determine data stationarity, so as to address concerns of spurious regression (Granger and Newbold, 1974 Based on the significance criterion of  = 0.01 used throughout the rest of this paper, most AR parameters are statistically significant. All the regression-specific AR processes are stationary, with a regression-specific sum of AR(1) to AR(5) parameter estimates less than 1.0. Hence, our regression residuals do not follow a random walk, obviating concerns of spurious regression (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993) .
Results
Regression results
Most of the slope-coefficients are statistically significant with the expected signs. Consider the estimates for the Henry Hub natural-gas price, which measure the market-based marginal heat rates (Woo et al., 2015) . For the non-West price regressions, the market-based heat rates are estimated to be 8.55
MMBTU/MWH to 9.38 MMBTU/MWH, nicely matching our assumed heat rate of 9 MMBTU/MWH for a new CT. The West region's heat rate estimate is low at around 4 MMBTU/MWH, reflecting that the region's wind generation accounts for over 50% of the region's total generation capacity of about 12,000 MW, thus causing the West region to have fewer hours of natural-gas being the marginal fuel than the non-West regions.
Rising non-West regional loads tend to significantly raise the market prices. An increase in the West regional load, however, tends to reduce non-West regional market prices because it helps to reduce the occasional inter-regional transmission congestion caused by the wind export from the West region (Woo et al., 2011b) . Finally, the estimated marginal effects of wind generation on the RTM prices are all significantly negative, confirming wind generation's merit-order effects.
The coefficient estimates for the per MWH procurement cost regressions have smaller size and the same sign as those in price regressions. This is expected because of the procurement cost being capped by the electricity market price.
Before using the ITUSR regression results to quantify the various payoff effects, we perform several final checks:
 Order of the AR process. We consider an AR(6) process in our regression, finding that the AR(6) parameter estimates are generally insignificant. Hence, we retain the AR(5) assumption.
 Time-dependent variance. We assume the error terms to follow an AR(5)/ GARCH (1, 1) process. The estimated process, however, is non-stationary. Hence, we do not adopt the GARCH process.
 Time-of-day (TOD) effects. We include interactions terms in our regressions to allow for the TOD effects.
Each interaction term is the product of a RHS driver and the on-peak period indicator = 1 for 08:00-22:00, Monday to Saturday, 0 for the remaining hours. 11 As a great majority of the interaction terms' estimates are statistically insignificant, we decide to exclude the TOD effects.
 Nonlinearity. We include squared terms of the drivers as additional RHS variables. A majority of the expanded regression's coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant, indicating over-specification.
Hence, we retain our simpler linear specification. Table 5 reports the estimated payoff changes due to a marginal change in a given driver. All of the statistically significant estimates have the expected signs. This table leads to the following inferences:
Marginal payoff effects
 A $1/MMBTU increase in natural-gas price tends to increase the payoffs by at least $3.72/MWH in the non-West regions. However, it does not have a statistically significant impact on the West regional payoffs.
 The statistically significant estimates for regional loads suggest that a 1-MWH increase in the non-West loads tends to raise the payoffs in all regions by at least $0.016/MWH. The same 1-MWH increase in the West regional load, however, tends to reduce the non-West regional payoffs, chiefly due to the negative price effects of the West regional load reported in Tables 3 and 4 .
 A 1-MWH increase in nuclear generation tends to reduce the regional payoffs, but its estimated effects are insignificant.
 A 1-MWH increase in wind generation tends to cut the payoffs by about $0.01/MWH for the non-West regions, approximately half of the estimated effects for the West region.
Payoff changes
We estimate the payoff changes triggered by several hypothetical events. Rather than a prediction of the future, our estimation aims to shed light on what may occur when a plausible event takes place.
The first hypothetical event in Table 6 is a $1/MMBTU increase in natural-gas price, possibly due to the U.S. economic recovery, a slowdown in shale gas exploration, or an increase of the U.S. export of LNG to such natural-gas-poor countries as Japan and China. All non-West regions are projected to see significant payoff increases that are over 45% of their average payoff levels shown in Table 1 . The same $1/MMBTU increase, however, does not have a significant effect on the average payoff level in the West region.
The next hypothetical event is a 100-MWH regional load increase, which may result from a region's economic growth. We observe statistically significant payoff increases in non-West regions. For example, raising the Houston load by 100 MWH may increase the payoffs of an old CT in Houston by as much as 36.99%. However, a 100-MWH load increase in the West region tends to reduce the payoffs in the non-West regions.
The third hypothetical event is the state's loss of nuclear generation equal to the mean 15 minute nuclear output of 1,112 MWH (or 4,448 MW over the 15-minute interval). While the estimated increases in the payoff levels are insignificant, they can be as much as 88.14% for a new CCGT in the West region.
The final hypothetical event is the completion of the 5000-MW Mariah project that may increase the state's 15-minute total wind generation by 406-MWH (= 5000 MW * 0.33 capacity factor * 15 minutes / 60 minutes). 12 The 406-MWH increase may substantially reduce the payoff levels, ranging from -$3. Table 6 suggests plausible events (e.g., the loss of nuclear generation and an increase in the natural-gas price) that can improve the investment incentives for natural-gas-fired generation in Texas.
Conclusion
However, this improvement can be negated by the state's known wind generation development. Hence, there may be insufficient investment incentives for natural-gas-fired generation units that are critical for renewable integration and system reliability. Hence, ERCOT may eventually need a capacity market to resolve its inadequate reserve margin and stalled investments in natural-gas-fired generation units; this is notwithstanding that the investment in new natural gas plants no longer seems to be stalled, possibly due to newly adopted the $9,000/MWH price offer cap on 01/01/2015.
We would be remiss had we failed to acknowledge the potential pitfall in our analysis. In particular, our data sample has not seen large changes (e.g., mass retirement of old generation units and large development of wind generation) that can render our regression results inaccurate. Such changes imply that ERCOT's spot market price dynamics in the future may greatly differ from those in the past. That said, our regression-based approach remains valid and useful, as additional data can be collected in the next few years to update our payoff analysis.
generation on wholesale electricity prices in the hydro-rich Pacific Northwest. 
